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Foreword | Information and 
communications technology (ICT) may 
be the target of criminal activity, as well 
as a tool used to facilitate criminal acts.
Trust is placed in government employees 
to ensure that personal data are handled 
appropriately. However, there have been 
instances where this trust has been 
abused and data have been 
inappropriately accessed or otherwise 
used by insiders for illegitimate 
purposes. The misuse of ICT may also 
provide opportunities for financial gain, 
such as where accounting systems are 
manipulated by persons both within and 
external to agencies to commit fraud.
Using the findings from the Fraud against 
the Commonwealth cenuses collected by 
the Australian Institute of Criminology, 
data is presented regarding the misuse 
of ICT within the Australian Government 
over the three year period between 1 
July 2008 and 30 June 2011. It is 
concluded that although the ICT 
environment is rapidly changing, fraud 
control plans, organisational policies and 
technical standards for data security 
minimise the risk of ICT misuse and 
identify intervention points at which 
prevention and detection methods may 
be focused.
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Misuse of information and communications technology (ICT) includes theft of hardware and 
software, unauthorised access to computer systems and inappropriate use of equipment. 
Internal unauthorised access is recognised as being a major contributor to data breaches, as 
employees may use legitimate access to computer systems in inappropriate and unauthorised 
ways. Risks of internal misuse of ICT in the public sector increase as new technologies 
emerge and more data about individuals are collated and stored by governments.
This paper examines how ICT has been misused in the past within Commonwealth entities. It 
draws on the findings of the Fraud against the Commonwealth cenuses collected by the 
Australian Institute of Criminology (AIC) for the 2008–09, 2009–10 and 2010–11 reporting 
periods to document the nature and extent of the problem.
Internal misuse of information and communications technology 
by public sector employees
ICT may be both the target of criminal activity, as well as a tool used to facilitate criminal 
acts (Choo, Smith & McCusker 2007). For the purpose of this paper, internal misuse refers 
to misuse by an employee or contractor of a government entity. By contrast, external 
misuse refers to incidents that are committed by individuals who are not an employee or 
contractor of the organisation. Instances of misuse of ICT within the public sector may fall 
within the definition of fraud provided in the Commonwealth Fraud Control Guidelines 2011 
(the Guidelines), namely ‘dishonestly obtaining a benefit, or causing a loss, by deception or 
other means’ (AGD 2011: 5).
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According to KPMG (2013), the most 
concerning frauds against organisations are 
those perpetrated by employees, as they tend 
to be committed for longer periods and may 
cause more reputational damage than external 
fraud. Over a three year period between 2008 
and 2011, the estimated value of internal 
fraud against the Commonwealth has steadily 
increased, from $1.9m in 2008–09 (Lindley 
& Smith 2011) to $3m in 2010–11 (Jorna 
& Smith 2013). Internal misuse of ICT is an 
important area of concern as employees 
are often placed in a position of trust, which 
provides them with electronic access to 
personal information and records. Prior 
research has shown that in some instances, 
there are few checks on an employee’s 
access (Smith & Jorna 2011). The outcomes 
of internal misuse can be damaging to the 
organisation and in the case of the public 
sector, taxpayers’ confidence.
There are significant implications of misuse 
of ICT in the public sector, particularly owing 
to the amount of data that are held about 
individuals by governments. For example, 
data held by different tiers of government 
may include:
• health, income, employment and 
education information;
• details about contact with the criminal 
justice system;
• information such as address and date of 
birth; and
• photographs associated with licences and 
passports.
Data may also be collected that could track 
individuals’ movements and daily activities, 
such as public transport usage. Misuse 
of ICT may also ‘deplete government 
resources and have a negative impact on 
the administration of agencies’, affecting 
the availability of funds for service and 
program delivery (Lindley, Jorna & Smith 
2012: ix). Where misuse of ICT results in 
data breaches, there can be further negative 
impacts arising from the loss and subsequent 
misuse of individuals’ personal information.
Relying on police and prosecution data to 
identify the extent of insider misuse of ICT 
does not provide a complete picture, as 
many matters go undetected, unreported, 
or may not have enough evidence or be 
serious enough to warrant investigation 
or prosecution (Lindley & Smith 2011). 
Not all misuse of ICT may be classified as 
criminal behaviour, but may instead violate 
the Australian Public Service Code of 
Conduct, organisational policies or attract 
civil remedies. Regardless of whether an 
incident involves the commission of a criminal 
offence, it may result in disciplinary action 
being taken, such as a formal warning, 
demotion or job loss.
Research questions
In order to understand misuse of ICT in 
the public sector, this paper addresses the 
following questions:
• What is the nature and extent of insider 
misuse of ICT in the public sector?
• What are the characteristics of those who 
engage in insider misuse of ICT in the 
public sector?
• What opportunities for ICT misuse are 
provided in the workplace?
Method
This research draws upon the results of 
the AIC’s Commonwealth Fraud Survey for 
the 2008–09 and 2009–10 financial years 
and the Commonwealth Fraud Census 
2010–11. The requirements for reporting 
on fraud and fraud control as set out by 
the Guidelines are outlined by Linley, Jorna 
and Smith (2012). Each year, the number of 
entities invited to participate differed slightly 
from the number that responded because 
new entities are created and others are 
removed or amalgamated. In addition, 
there are a small number of departments 
that choose not to participate for various 
reasons, including interests of national 
security. Finally, of the entities that did 
respond, some were excluded because they 
did not meet the eligibility criteria pursuant to 
the previous Guidelines. Entity particulars 
included in the analysis for each of the 
reporting periods are presented in Table 1.
Responding bodies completed a secure 
online questionnaire for each reporting period. 
The data collection examined two distinct 
categories of conduct—internal fraud and 
external fraud. The data included in the 
present analysis relates to internal frauds, 
defined as ‘any incident of suspected fraud 
allegedly committed by an employee or 
contractor’ (Jorna & Smith 2015: 11). The 
forms of misuse of ICT examined in this 
paper are:
• theft of telecommunications or computer 
equipment (including mobile devices);
• accessing information or programs via a 
computer without authorisation;
• copying or altering data or programs 
without authorisation;
• misuse of email;
• manipulation of a computerised 
accounting system;
• insertion of malicious code; and
• interference with computer networks.
Between the financial years, there were 
some slight variations in the wording of 
the questions asked in the questionnaire. 
However, the differences were not marked 
enough to prevent comparison between 
the results collected over the reporting 
periods. The 2010–11 census included 
an additional section relating to the most 
costly internal fraud incident experienced 
by each entity that had been concluded 
during the reporting period, irrespective of 
when the fraud had been committed. An 
incident was considered finalised once an 
Table 1  Agencies participating in the 2008–09, 2009–10 and 2010–11 surveys
2008–09 2009–10 2010–11
n % n % n %
Invited to participate 177 100.0 191 100.0 192 100.0
Responded 166 93.8 175 91.6 154 80.2
Included in analysis 149 84.2 152 79.6 154 80.2
Note: Percentages are of those invited to participate
Source: Commonwealth fraud surveys 2008–09, 2009–10 and Commonwealth fraud census 2010–11 data [AIC computer file]
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investigation had been completed, referred 
to another body, or upon the suspect 
leaving the employment of the entity. 
Information was sought in relation to the 
suspect, or if the incident involved more 
than one person, the principal suspect.
To provide context to and illustrate the 
types of misuse of ICT that have been 
detected in the public sector, relevant 
case studies from the Commonwealth 
Director of Public Prosecutions’ annual 
reports are also provided.
Nature and extent of misuse
Over the three years between 2008 and 
2011, 4,403 incidents involving internal 
misuse of ICT were reported. As shown 
in Figure 1, 1,976 incidents were reported 
in 2008–09, however this decreased by 
40 percent in 2009–10, down to 1,196 
incidents. In 2010–11, there was a three 
percent increase, with 1,231 reported 
incidents. The proportion of total internal 
frauds that involve misuse of ICT has 
decreased in recent years, from 59 percent 
in 2008–09 to 32 percent in 2010–11.
Misuse of ICT was approximately twice 
as likely to be involved in internal, rather 
than external, frauds over the 2008–09 
to 2010–11 periods (see Table 2). The 
following sections provide an overview of 
the internal fraud incidents involving ICT by 
type of misuse.
Theft of telecommunications or 
computer equipment (including 
mobile devices)
The value of computer equipment is greater 
than just the replacement cost of the 
hardware when the device(s) have been 
used to store proprietary or customer-related 
data. Computers and mobile devices may be 
targeted for this reason (Smith & Jorna 2011).
On average, 13 agencies reported having 
experienced theft of telecommunications or 
computer equipment each reporting period. 
The average number of incidents per year 
was 62 (of an average 3,400 internal fraud 
incidents per year). As shown in Table 3, 
there was a reduction in the number of 
reported thefts in the 2010-11 survey, down 
to 45 incidents from 72 the previous year.
Three agencies reported theft of 
telecommunications or computer equipment 
as being the most costly internal fraud 
incident concluded in 2010–11. One incident 
also involved accessing information via a 
computer without authorisation and therefore 
is discussed in the next section of this paper.
Of the two incidents covered here, both 
involved only one suspect. In addition to 
theft of telecommunications or computer 
equipment, both suspects had allegedly 
stolen other government equipment. The 
motivations for the thefts were unknown or 
not provided for either incident. The total 
financial losses caused to the agencies were 
$5,000 and $8,000. Losses were defined as 
‘the total amount, in whole dollars, thought 
to have been lost to the agency from fraud 
incidents, prior to the recovery of any 
funds, and excluding the costs of detection, 
investigation or prosecution’. One incident 
did not result in any financial recovery, while 
the other resulted in full recovery.
Figure 1 Total reported internal incidents of fraud and fraud involving misuse of ICT in 
2008–09, 2009–10 and 2010–11 (n)
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Source: Commonwealth fraud surveys 2008–09, 2009–10 and Commonwealth fraud census 2010–11 data [AIC computer file]
Table 2 Agencies reporting internal and external frauds involving misuse of ICT in 2008–09, 
2009–10 and 2010–11
Internal fraud External fraud
Reporting period Agencies (n) Agencies (%) Agencies (n) Agencies (%)
2008–09 23 15 10 7
2009–10 20 13 10 7
2010–11 24 16 13 8
Source: Commonwealth fraud surveys 2008–09, 2009–10 and Commonwealth fraud census 2010–11 data [AIC computer file]
Table 3 Theft of telecommunications or computer equipment (including mobile device) by 
reporting period (n)
Reporting period Number of agencies Total incidents
2008–09 16 70
2009–10 13 72
2010–11 10 45
Source: Commonwealth fraud surveys 2008–09, 2009–10 and Commonwealth fraud census 2010–11 data [AIC computer file]
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One of the incidents occurred over a 
period of six months, while the other 
occurred during a single month. Once 
detected, the incidents took between 
one and 13 months to be finalised. Both 
incidents were investigated by the agency, 
with one also being investigated by police. 
One suspect admitted to the allegation in 
full and had a legal sanction imposed. The 
other was dismissed from employment 
with legal proceedings incomplete at the 
time of the data collection period.
Accessing information or programs 
via a computer without authorisation
Data breaches can occur by accessing or 
copying data without authorisation. The 
number of compromised records may 
be one indication of the severity of the 
breach, as is the sensitivity of the data and 
how they are subsequently used. This is 
particularly relevant to the public sector, 
where employees and contractors can have 
access to sensitive information relating 
to individuals, government contracts, 
procurement details, business records and 
even national security issues.
Some context to accessing information 
without authorisation is provided by way 
of cases studies from the Commonwealth 
Director of Public Prosecutions. In 2007, a 
government employee resigned after being 
found to have accessed computer records 
over a two year period of people known 
or associated with people known to the 
individual. The matter proceeded to court, 
where the defendant pleaded guilty. The 
offences, motivated by curiosity, were found 
to have resulted from a ‘mental condition’ 
and the breakdown of a violent relationship 
(CDPP 2009). In another case, the alleged 
offender, a law enforcement officer, not only 
accessed data relating to a romantic interest 
and their partner, but also subsequently 
disclosed information relating to the latter to 
others (CDPP 2010).
In a case involving a consultant contracted 
to an Australian Government department, 
another’s authentication credentials were 
used to access data after the offender’s 
access was revoked. Over a period of 19 
days, the offender accessed the records 
of 75 individuals. Convicted, the offender 
was originally sentenced to 12 months’ 
imprisonment with a good behaviour 
condition of three years. The sentence was 
reduced to 50 hours of community service 
on appeal, primarily as the offender had not 
received any personal benefit (CDPP 2009).
Accessing information or programs using 
a computer without authorisation was the 
most commonly reported type of internal 
fraud, with 3,818 incidents reported over 
the three year period (see Table 4). However, 
the number of incidents reported had been 
declining, with the number almost halving 
from 1,816 in 2008–09 to 991 incidents in 
2010–11.
Two agencies reported that the most 
costly internal fraud incident concluded in 
2010–11 involved accessing information 
via a computer without authorisation. 
Each incident involved only one suspect, 
one of whom (as noted previously) had 
also allegedly stolen telecommunications 
or computer equipment, as well as other 
government equipment and misused ICT 
in other ways. While the motivation of one 
suspect was unknown, the other was 
reportedly motivated by greed and the 
desire for financial gain.
One incident occurred over a period of six 
months, while the other continued for seven 
years. Both incidents were investigated 
by the agency in question. One incident 
involved ‘no further action’ being taken, 
while the other was still under investigation 
at the time of the survey, with legal 
proceedings to be commenced.
For one incident, the total financial loss 
was $5,076, of which $2,688 (53%) was 
recovered from the suspect. For the 
other incident, the total financial loss was 
$524,789, of which $13,327 (3%) was 
recovered. This was the highest financial 
loss reported by participating entities in this 
section of the census.
Copying or altering data or 
programs without authorisation
Each year, Verizon, a company providing 
network, information system and mobile 
Table 4 Internal frauds involving misuse of ICT, by method, in 2008–09, 2009–10 and 2010–11 (n)
2008–09 2009–10 2010–11 Overall total incidents
Type of fraud involving misuse of ICT Agencies Total incidents Agencies Total incidents Agencies Total incidents
Accessing information or programs via a 
computer without authorisation
17 1,816 8 1,011 13 991 3,818
Copying or altering data or programs 
without authorisation
6 21 7 34 8 18 73
Misuse of email 3 9 8 35 9 57 101
Manipulation of a computerised 
accounting systema
2 3 4 4 - - 7
Insertion of malicious code 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Interference with computer networks 0 0 1 6 0 0 6
Unable to be determined 1 1 0 0 1 1 2
Other misuse of ICT 5 56 6 34 11 119 209
a: This response option was omitted from the 2010–11 survey
Source: Commonwealth fraud surveys 2008–09, 2009–10 and Commonwealth fraud census 2010–11 data [AIC computer file]
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technology products and services, publishes 
a report detailing data breaches that have 
been identified worldwide. In 2012, 14 
percent of breaches involved those internal 
to the organisation. This is an increase from 
four percent in 2012, however, down from a 
high of 48 percent in 2009 (Verizon 2013).
In the Commonwealth Fraud Survey 2008–09 
and 2009–10 and the Commonwealth Fraud 
Census 2010–11, copying or altering data or 
programs without authorisation was reported 
73 times over the three year period between 
2008 and 2011. On average, seven agencies 
reported instances of unauthorised copying 
or altering of data or programs each financial 
year (see Table 4). None of the agencies 
reported copying or altering data or programs 
without authorisation as being the most costly 
internal fraud incident concluded in 2010–11.
Copying or altering data can lead to other 
offences. For example, in the case described 
in Box 1, altering data led to obtaining 
property by deception. In 2007, a similar 
matter was discovered that involved the 
creation of 65 false identities on the agency’s 
database system that resulted in 387 
fraudulent medical benefit claims to the value 
of $156,034.50 (CDPP 2010).
Misuse of email
Email misuse includes sending emails and 
attachments that contravene organisations’ 
internal policies such as codes of ethics, 
email usage policies and sexual harassment 
policies. Some email misuse may also 
be considered illegal if it relates to the 
possession or distribution of child exploitation 
material or threatens, menaces, harasses 
or causes offence. Misuse of email can also 
contribute to other offences, such as unlawful 
disclosure (see Box 2).
In the Commonwealth Fraud Survey 
2008–09 and 2009–10 and the 
Commonwealth Fraud Census 2010–11, 
reported misuse of email increased almost 
fourfold from nine incidents in 2008–09 to 
35 incidents in 2009–10. In 2010–11, the 
number of reported incidents increased 
another 63 percent to 57 (see Table 4). While 
this response option was omitted when 
asking about the most costly internal fraud 
incident experienced by each organisation, 
one entity did include misuse of email under 
the ‘other’ response category. As this incident 
also involved manipulation of a computerised 
accounting system, among other frauds, it is 
discussed in the following section.
Manipulation of a computerised 
accounting system
A variety of frauds can take place using 
computerised accounting systems, including 
redirecting funds to personal bank accounts, 
approving false invoices and creating ‘ghost 
employees’ for the purpose of receiving 
salary payments (Smith & Jorna 2011). In 
the Commonwealth Fraud Survey 2008–09 
and 2009–10 and the Commonwealth Fraud 
Census 2010–11, two entities reported that 
a total of three fraud incidents occurred as 
a result of manipulation of a computerised 
accounting system in 2008–09. This number 
increased to four entities each recording one 
incident in 2009–10. This response option 
was omitted in the 2010–11 questionnaire 
(see Table 4).
Two entities reported manipulation of a 
computerised accounting system as being 
the most costly internal fraud incident 
concluded in 2010–11. One incident 
involved only one suspect, while the other 
allegedly had seven other co-offenders.
In addition to manipulation of a computerised 
accounting system, one suspect was also 
suspected of theft of cash/currency (including 
theft of petty cash). The other was suspected 
of a number of additional frauds, including 
theft of consumable stock (office related), 
misuse of government equipment, misuse of 
agency courier accounts, misuse of email, 
accepting kickbacks and other corruption, 
namely ‘abuse of power’. The motivation 
for one suspect was unknown, while the 
other was reportedly ‘professional financial 
problems’.
One incident took place over a 45 month 
period, while the other occurred over 
64 months. In both cases, the entities 
investigated the incidents and finalised the 
matters within four months. Outcomes 
of the investigations at the time of the 
census included one suspect admitting to 
the allegation in full with legal proceedings 
incomplete, while the other was referred to 
the Australian Federal Police with no legal 
proceedings undertaken. The total financial 
losses caused to the organisations were 
$15,638 and $129,960, with neither incident 
resulting in recovery of any of the funds.
Box 1 Copying or altering data or programs without authorisation
Over a three month period, the defendant, a Centrelink employee, created 26 
Centrelink customer accounts in false names and caused benefits to be paid to those 
accounts. He then obtained the benefits paid.
The defendant also caused payments in the form of Electronic Benefit Transfers 
to be made to four accounts of Centrelink customers known to him without their 
authorisation. The defendant obtained the money for himself.
The defendant obtained a total amount of $66,120.36 and was charged with 30 counts 
of obtaining property by deception pursuant to s 134.1(1) of the Criminal Code. He 
pleaded not guilty at the committal hearing in the Magistrates Court of South Australia 
but subsequently pleaded guilty at his District Court trial.
The defendant was sentenced to a total sentence of four years imprisonment to be 
released after serving 18 months. In sentencing the defendant the Court stated:
It is very serious offending involving gross breaches of trust on a sustained 
basis...I must bear in mind that the courts have made it clear on many occasions 
that in dealing with this sort of fraud, particularly where the person involved is a 
government employee, there is a significant need for the sentence to be such that 
it will deter others in a position of trust who are minded to attempt to defraud the 
welfare system.
Source: CDPP 2010: 19
6  |  Australian Institute of Criminology
Insertion of malicious code
The potential outcomes of insertion of 
malicious code include account names 
and passwords being compromised, files 
being accessed or copied and corruption 
of hardware or software. Spyware, which 
can monitor computer activity, may be 
inserted intentionally by an employee to 
obtain sensitive information (Smith & Jorna 
2011). Malicious code infections may result 
from other misuse, such as downloading 
and installing unauthorised software such 
as a game.
No incidents involving the insertion of 
malicious code by an insider were reported 
over the three year period (see Table 4). 
Similarly, there were no reports that insertion 
of malicious code had been the most costly 
internal fraud incident concluded in 2010–
11. This is not to say that entities did not 
experience malicious code infections; rather, 
it may be hard to attribute infections to an 
individual or resulting from fraudulent intent.
Interference with computer 
networks
During the three years, only one organisation 
reported that an employee or contractor 
had interfered with computer networks; 
this was reported in the 2009–10 financial 
year. The entity advised that there had 
been six incidents involving interference (see 
Table 4). This entity reported that they had 
experienced six ‘attempted denial of service’ 
attacks. Denial of service attacks block 
access to online services, such as websites 
or accounts. This can occur by sending a 
flood of traffic to overwhelm websites to 
make them inaccessible to legitimate users.
None of the entities reported interference 
with computer networks as being the most 
costly internal fraud incident concluded in 
2010–11.
Other types of misuse
Over the three years, 209 incidents involving 
other types of misuse of ICT were reported. 
In 2010–11, 11 agencies reported 119 
incidents, an increase of 164 percent over 
the average of 45 incidents reported in the 
previous two periods (see Table 4). This 
increase was due to a report from one 
organisation of 102 instances of misuse of 
a point of sale system. Misuse of a point 
of sale system can conceal unauthorised 
transactions, as per the example provided 
in Box 3.
While five entities reported other misuse 
of ICT as being the most costly internal 
fraud incident concluded in 2010–11, two 
of these have already been discussed as 
they also involved misuse of ICT as covered 
in the preceding sections. Of the remaining 
three entities, each incident involved only 
one suspect.
One of the suspects was alleged to have 
used an ‘inappropriate and extensive 
amount of email’, as well as misuse of 
government equipment. Another was 
alleged to have used the ‘departmental 
phone for personal purposes’ as well 
as committing fraud in relation to travel 
expenses and expenses other than travel. 
The third suspect was alleged to have 
committed a number of frauds including:
• theft of other government equipment;
• theft of consumable stock (office related);
• misuse of government equipment;
• expenses other than travel, leave and 
related entitlements;
• theft of property other than cash; and
• false quotations for work.
In this case, it was reported that the 
alleged misuse of ICT was to ‘circumvent 
procurement procedures’ and prevent 
‘separation of duties’. The motivations of the 
three suspects were reportedly personal and 
family financial problems, psychiatric illness 
or mental disorder(s), and ‘malicious and to 
cause trouble and mischief’.
The incidents occurred over a period of two 
months to two years, with an average of 
12 months and three weeks. For the two 
incidents with a known detection date, 
the incidents had been finalised within eight 
and 15 months. All three incidents had been 
investigated by the entities. Outcomes of 
the investigations included one suspect 
being dismissed from employment with no 
Box 2 Misuse of email
The defendant was a senior public servant in the Indigenous Policy area of the 
Department of Families and Community Services and Indigenous Affairs. In that 
capacity, she forwarded an email outlining draft talking points for Australian 
Government diplomatic efforts in relation to the Draft Declaration of Rights for 
Indigenous People to her daughter. She also forwarded four emails on topics of 
dysfunction in outback Indigenous communities to a long-standing family friend…
at a time when issues of Indigenous dysfunction were topical and the Australian 
Government was considering its response.
It was also alleged that the defendant had disclosed draft talking points for her 
superior’s Senate testimony prior to the information being in the public domain and…
she unlawfully disclosed to a long-standing family friend allegations of wrongdoing 
made against that family friend.
The defendant was charged with seven counts of unlawful disclosure by a 
Commonwealth officer pursuant to s 70(1) of the Crimes Act. On 28 August 2008, 
following a trial in the Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory, a jury found the 
defendant guilty of five counts. The defendant was acquitted on the count relating to the 
disclosure of her superior’s Senate testimony and the jury were unable to reach a verdict 
on the count relating to the disclosure of allegation of wrongdoing made against a family 
friend. That count was later discontinued by the prosecution.
On 14 October 2008, in the Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory, the 
defendant was convicted and released on the condition that she be of good behaviour 
for three years and pay a pecuniary penalty of $2,000 within six months.
Source: CDPP 2009: 97
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legal proceedings having been undertaken 
at the time of the survey. The other two 
suspects resigned or left employment, with 
one being dealt with under the entity’s 
code of conduct.
One of the incidents did not cause the 
agency any financial loss. The financial loss 
caused in another incident ‘could not be 
determined’ and resulted in no recovery 
of losses. The third organisation reported 
a loss of $2,987, with the entire amount 
recovered from the suspect.
Characteristics of those who 
engage in internal misuse of 
ICT in the public sector
As well as detailing the nature of the 
offence, the most costly incident of fraud 
section included in the 2010–11 census 
asked about the suspects’ demographic 
information. Of the nine suspects who were 
reported to have engaged in insider misuse of 
ICT in the public sector, seven were male, 
one was female and the gender of the 
remaining suspect was not disclosed by the 
organisation. Four of the nine suspects were 
aged 45 to 54 years. Two of the suspects 
were aged 55 to 64, two were aged 35 to 
44 years and the remaining suspect was 
aged 25 to 34 years.
Eight of the nine suspects had been 
employed on a full-time basis, while the 
other was reported to have been employed 
overseas. All had been employed with the 
entity for more than four years. Five of the 
suspects did not hold a security clearance. 
Of the remaining four suspects, two held 
a clearance at the ‘secret’ level, one at 
the ‘confidential’ level and one at the 
‘protected’ level.
While the highest education level for four 
of the suspects was not known, three had 
been educated to a graduate level and two 
to a postgraduate level. Five suspects had 
been employed at a middle management 
level, one at an intermediate level and one at 
an advanced level. The occupation levels for 
two suspects were not disclosed.
Opportunities for misuse
The questions asked of respondents about 
the most costly internal fraud incident 
experienced provided a unique insight into 
the context surrounding those who were 
suspected of committing internal frauds. 
For instance, the finding that all of the 
incidents that involved misuse of ICT were 
allegedly committed by employees who 
had been with the entity for four or more 
years may be due to this extended time 
period enabling the offender to acquire 
knowledge about how the organisation 
operated and how to commit the alleged 
offence. In some instances, the offence had 
escaped detection for some time—up to 
seven years. The ability of an employee to 
evade detection for such a long period may 
be partly due to the individuals’ knowledge 
of internal processes and control, whereby 
they can avoid routine security checks.
Where the occupational levels of the 
suspects were known, all but one had been 
in a middle management or an advanced 
level role. There are some different theories 
as to why those engaged in positions of 
greater responsibility may commit and/
or be detected committing fraud. For 
example, those employed at higher 
occupational levels may be presented with 
more opportunities, may feel that their 
activities are less scrutinised, or they may 
have developed a misplaced sense of 
entitlement to the benefits received. An 
alternative explanation is that they may 
be no more likely to offend than those 
employed at lower occupation levels, 
however, they may be subject to greater 
Box 3 Other types of misuse (point of sale system)
The defendant was the licensee of [a] Licensed Post Office. An audit of the Post Office 
conducted on 14 December 2007 revealed that $58,002.39 in cash was unaccounted 
for. The defendant told the auditors that he did not know where the money was. He 
subsequently declined to participate in a record of interview.
The Post Office kept cash in a safe. The defendant could not access the safe by 
himself as it had to be opened with two keys—one held by the defendant and one 
held by a security firm. It was later established that the defendant had been taking 
cash rather than depositing it in the safe and concealing the missing cash by making 
false accounting entries in the Electronic Point of Sale computer system. The accounts 
appeared to balance, however, the amount of money asserted to be held in the safe 
was incorrect.
On an evening prior to the security firm’s monthly collection of the cash held in the safe, 
the defendant made an accounting entry that purported to withdraw cash from the 
safe, so that the amount of cash recorded as being in the safe matched the amount 
actually held. A security officer then collected the cash from the safe and recorded 
an amount matching the entry on the Post Office’s accounts. After the collection, the 
defendant made an electronic entry reversing the withdrawal of the previous evening.
The defendant was charged one count of dishonestly causing a loss to a Commonwealth 
entity pursuant to s 135.1(5) of the Criminal Code.
On 6 July 2009, the defendant pleaded guilty in the Wollongong Local Court. On 
27 October 2009, he unsuccessfully applied to reverse his plea. The defendant was 
sentenced to a total of 11 months imprisonment to be served by way of periodic 
detention and a reparation order in the amount of $58,002.39.
The defendant appealed against his conviction to the District Court of New South Wales. 
The appeal was dismissed on 19 March 2010.
Source: CDPP 2010: 15
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scrutiny and therefore their fraudulent 
activities may be more likely to be detected 
and subsequently reported. In addition, 
frauds conducted by those in higher 
positions may be of a higher value and 
therefore more likely to be captured in the 
most costly internal fraud incident section 
of the questionnnaire. Internal misuse of ICT 
was often not the sole offence the suspect 
was allegedly involved in. In one instance, 
misuse of ICT enabled other frauds by 
circumventing procurement procedures.
Of the 154 agency participants in the 
2010–11 census, nine reported that the most 
costly internal fraud completed in 2011 
involved some aspect of ICT. A further 35 
entities reported that they had finalised 
a costly fraud matter in that reporting 
period that did not involve misuse of 
ICT. This section of the questionnaire also 
asked about how these incidents were 
detected. Respondents were permitted 
to select more than one response, which 
are detailed in Table 5. Interestingly, all 
but one of the incidents involving misuse 
of ICT was discovered during internal 
audits/investigations and/or by a staff 
member or colleague. The other incident 
was discovered by reportedly applying 
‘internal controls’. This indicates that 
internal oversight, whether formal by way 
of audits, or informal by way of confirming 
co-workers’ suspicions, are useful in 
detecting misuse when compared with other 
methods. This was not dissimilar to frauds 
that did not involve misuse of ICT, where the 
most common ways frauds were discovered 
also involved internal oversight (Jorna & 
Smith 2015).
Discussion and conclusion
The ICT environment is rapidly changing and 
rates of, and opportunities for, misuse shift 
in reflection of this. The number of known 
internal fraud incidents involving the use of 
ICT has declined since 2008–09. However, 
internal misuse of ICT was reported by 
twice as many entities as misuse of ICT 
by those external to the organisation. The 
most commonly reported fraud type was 
accessing information or programs via a 
computer without authorisation, although the 
occurrence of this has reportedly declined to 
almost half the number of incidents recorded 
in 2010–11 when compared with 2008–09. 
Another explanation as to why the number 
of detected incidents may fluctuate is that 
organisations may change their practices in 
identifying misuse of ICT. For example, as 
emails are liable for collection under Freedom 
of Information requests, organisations may 
be more sensitive to misuse of, and more 
likely to monitor, these communications.
Most suspects who were alleged to have 
committed the most costly incidents 
reported by entities in 2010–11 were 
male, had been employed with the 
agency for many years and in all but one 
instance, were aged 35 years or over. 
While almost all offenders were believed 
to have operated alone, the one offender 
who reportedly colluded with others was 
suspected of working with seven co-
offenders to commit frauds that included 
manipulation of a computerised accounting 
system. In this research, it was found that 
the majority of the suspected offenders 
held middle management (Executive Level 
1 or 2) positions. The frauds were also 
committed over a sustained time period, on 
average for two years and three months, 
before detection.
All of the incidents were detected using 
internal controls. The most common 
penalty imposed was dismissal from 
employment, although legal proceedings 
had been imposed, or were expected to be 
commenced, in relation to a number  
of incidents.
It is noted that the 2010–11 queationnaire 
instrument collected further information 
about the most costly internal frauds. 
However, incidents that involve ICT, such 
as the loss of information, may not always 
incur a financial loss. Therefore, this may 
not capture those incidents that result in 
reputational damage and lasting effects to 
those external to the organisation.
While a reactive approach is important to 
identify and address misuse of ICT, it is 
likely that many instances of misuse of ICT 
go undetected and unreported. Fraud in 
general is known to be vastly underreported 
(Lindley, Jorna & Smith 2012) and fraud 
involving ICT may be particularly so. This 
may be due to policies not yet being in 
place that relate to evolving technology 
and the detection and prevention of misuse 
of ICT. Therefore, a proactive approach 
is important in preventing the losses and 
damage that can otherwise be incurred.
According to the Guidelines, all agencies 
are required to have fraud control plans 
that encompass prevention strategies, as 
well as policies on detection, reporting and 
investigation of fraud. Technical standards 
for data security, as well as organisational 
policies, also play a preventive role. Future 
AIC research will identify the prevention and 
control strategies that agencies can use to 
minimise risks of misuse of ICT, including 
the identification of intervention points at 
which prevention and detection methods 
might best be focused.
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